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1. Over the last years, authorities across the world have adopted or commis-
sioned reports on the competition issues raised in the digital economy, in order
to explore how to handle the increasing economic, innovation and informa-
tional power of Big Tech firms.1 They are now beginning to unveil their plans
for action. On 15 December 2020, the European Commission tabled a legisla-
tive proposal for a Digital Markets Act (DMA), the goal of which is to increase
the contestability and fairness of the EU digital economy.2 The same day, the
Commission also introduced the Digital Services Act (DSA) proposal, with the
aim of ensuring that Europe is a safe, predictable and trusted online environ-
ment where fundamental rights are protected.3 Those proposals are now in the
legislative process before the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.
They could be made into law by 2022, and begin to apply in 2023.
2. This paper focuses on the DMA, which the Commission presents as an attempt 
to avoid the perceived pitfalls of applying competition law to digital markets,
in particular the intricacy of the analysis, the duration of cases and the lack of
effectiveness of some of its remedies. The DMA would accordingly complement
competition law with a stylised form of regulation that eschews lengthy analysis
of specific markets, firms and practices in favour of synthetic concepts that are
meant to generalise from available data and enforcement practice. In this paper,
we assume for the sake of argument that there is sufficient momentum to carry
through the DMA proposal in line with its basic principles, and accordingly we
focus more on specific aspects where the proposal could be improved. After this
1 See, for instance, Crémer et al. (2019), Furman et al. (2019), Scott Morton et al. (2019). For a list of  those reports, see Alexiadis 
and de Streel (2020), and for a summary of  some of  those reports, see Ennis and Fletcher (2020).
2 Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector 
(Digital Markets Act), COM(2020) 842 final, 15 December 2020. The Impact Assessment of  the Commission services provides 
very useful background information to better understand the rationale of  the proposal: Impact Assessment Report Accompanying 
the Document Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on contestable and fair markets in the 
digital sector (Digital Markets Act), SWD(2020) 363 final, 15 December 2020. 
3 Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital 
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ABSTRACT
The paper analyses the recent European 
Commission Proposal for a Digital Markets 
Act which will regulate the digital gatekeepers 
in order to increase market contestability and 
fairness in the European digital economy. 
First, the paper summarises the main 
elements of the Commission proposal: 
objectives, scope, criteria to designate 
gatekeepers, obligations imposed on 
gatekeepers as well as institutional design and 
enforcement mechanisms. Then, for each of 
those elements, the paper suggests 
improvements to the Commission proposal, 
in order to make the Digital Markets Act more 
flexible and adaptable to the rapid pace of 
change of digital markets and to straighten 
out issues of institutional coordination and 
enforcement effectiveness.
Cet article étudie la récente proposition de la 
Commission européenne pour une législation 
sur les marchés numériques qui vise à réguler 
les contrôleurs d’accès en vue de d’accroitre 
la contestabilité des marchés et l’équité dans 
l’économie numérique européenne. D’abord, 
l’article résume les principaux éléments de la 
proposition : ses objectifs, son champ 
d’application, les critères pour désigner les 
contrôleurs d’accès, les obligations imposées 
à ces contrôleurs ainsi que le système 
institutionnel et de mise en œuvre. Ensuite, 
pour chacun de ces éléments, l’article propose 
des améliorations à la proposition de la 
Commission en vue de rendre la législation 
plus flexible et adaptable à l’évolution rapide 
des marchés numériques ainsi que 
d’améliorer la coordination institutionnelle et 
l’effectivité de la mise en œuvre
This paper is partly based on the CERRE First 
Assessment of the DMA (January 2021), which 
was written with contributions from Amelia 
Fletcher, Richard Feasey, Jan Krämer, Bruno 
Liebhaberg and Giorgio Monti. The authors thank 
Axel Desmedt, Alexandre Ruiz Feases and Thomas 
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introduction, section II summarises the main elements of 
the DMA proposal; then, section III makes some recom-





1. Objectives and principles
3. The general goal of the DMA is to ensure a high level
of innovation, quality of service, user choice and compe-
titive and fair pricing in the European digital economy.4
To achieve this general goal, the DMA proposal sets three 
specific objectives:5 (i) ensure contestability of digital
markets, which means that markets should remain open
to new entrants and innovators; (ii) guarantee fairness in
the B2B relationship between the digital gatekeepers and
their business users, which is defined as a balance between 
the rights and obligations of each party and the absence
of a disproportionate advantage in favour of the digital
gatekeepers;6 and (iii) strengthen the internal market.
4. Contestability refers to decreasing entry barriers to
digital markets and to levelling the playing field among
existing gatekeepers and other firms offering substitute or 
complementary digital services.7 In so doing, long-term
efficiency (i.e., the future size of the pie) and consumer
welfare are expected to increase. The objective of fairness 
is more akin to ex post fairness and relates to distribu-
tion of the value created by digital markets (the division
of the pie).8 Contestability and fairness are also pursued
by other EU laws, such as competition law and the
emerging “platform law” which consists of the Platform-
to-Business Regulation,9 the GDPR,10 the Audiovisual
4 DMA Proposal, recitals  25 and 79. For the intervention logic underlying the DMA
Proposal, see Impact Assessment, p. 31.
5 DMA Proposal, Art. 1(1).
6 DMA Proposal, Art. 10(2) and also Art. 7(6) and recital 57.
7 In this context, contestability is sometimes referred to as ex ante fairness: see Speech of
Executive VP  Vestager on Fairness and Competition, 25 January 2018, GCLC Annual 
Conference, available at https://wayback.archive-it.org/12090/20191129212136/
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/
fairness-and-competition_en.
8 Note that ex post fairness may also contribute to efficiency and innovation: see, among 
others, Clarkson and Van Alstyne (2020).
9 Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  20 June 
2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of  online intermediation 
services, OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 57 (hereinafter “P2B Regulation”).
10 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  27 April 
2016 on the protection of  natural persons with regard to the processing of  personal data 
and on the free movement of  such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation), OJ L 199, 4.5.2016, p. 1.
Media Services Directive11 and the European Electronic 
Communications Code.12 However, the Commission has 
identified some regulatory gaps that the DMA proposal 
aims to close.13 In covering those gaps, the DMA will 
complement—and not substitute for—those other EU 
rules.14 In particular, the DMA would apply when compe-
tition law cannot act or can only act in an ineffective 
manner in achieving market contestability and B2B fair-
ness.15 The DMA proposal also complements the GDPR 
by strengthening or extending some of its obligations.16
5. The objective of harmonisation is also key because the
biggest digital platforms operate on a global scale and
their conducts impact most, if  not all, Member States.17
To achieve regulatory harmonisation, the DMA proposal 
prohibits Member States from imposing further obliga-
tions on gatekeepers for the purpose of ensuring contest-
able and fair markets.18 However, Member States remain
free to impose obligations (i) which pursue other legit-
imate interests such as consumer protection or unfair
competition, or (ii) which are based on national compe-
tition rules, provided this is allowed under EU competi-
tion law.
6. In pursuing those three objectives, the DMA proposal
applies two key general principles of EU law:19 (i) firstly,
the principle of effectiveness which implies that any obli-
gation imposed should achieve the objectives of the
DMA; and (ii) secondly, the principle of proportion-
ality which implies that the content and form of regula-
tory obligations should not exceed what is necessary to
achieve the objectives of the DMA.20
11 Directive  2010/13/EU of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  10 March
2010 on the coordination of  certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or admin-
istrative action in Member States concerning the provision of  audiovisual media services 
(Audiovisual Media Services Directive), OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, p. 1, as amended by Directive 
(EU) 2018/1808 (hereinafter “AVMSD”).
12 Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of
11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code, [2018] 
OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, p. 36 (hereinafter “EECC”).
13 DMA Proposal, recitals 5, 10–11.
14 In EU economic law, regulation often complements regulation, see Dunne (2015), Hellwig 
(2009) and Larouche (2000).
15 DMA Proposal, recitals 9 and 10 and IA, paras. 119–124.
16 In particular the requirement of  user consent for so-called data fusion (when personal 
data from different platform services is being pooled) and obligations related to data por-
tability and transparency on consumer profiling algorithms: DMA Proposal, Arts. 5(a), 
6(1)(h) and (i), and Art. 13, respectively.
17 The proposal is based on Article 114 TFEU, which means that its main aim and purpose is 
to harmonise laws with a view to securing the internal market.
18 DMA Proposal, Art. 1(6).
19 See in particular DMA Proposal, Art.  7(2) for obligation specifications as well as
Art. 15(1) and (2) for additional behavioural and structural remedies in case of  systemat-
ic non-compliance.
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2. Services susceptible 
to ex ante regulation: 
Core platform services
7. The DMA proposal covers a closed list of eight digital 
services—or business models—which are named “core 
platform services” (CPS).21 Many of these services have 
already been defined in previous EU legislative enact-
ments. The eight CPSs are:
–  Online B2C intermediation services, which are infor-
mation society services22 (i) that allow business users to 
offer goods or services to consumers, (ii) with a view to 
facilitating the initiating of direct transactions between 
business users and consumers regardless of whether the 
transaction is finally concluded offline or online and 
(iii) which provide services to business users, based on 
contractual relationships between the platform and the 
business user.23 They include marketplaces24 such as 
Amazon Marketplace and app stores25 such as Apple 
App Store or Google Play Store. As the first part of 
the definition refers to consumers (and not end-users), 
intermediation services do not include B2B intermedi-
ation services. 
–  Online search engines, which are information society 
services “allow[ing] users to input queries in order to 
perform searches of, in principle, all websites, or all 
websites in a particular language, on the basis of a query 
on any subject in the form of a keyword, voice request, 
phrase or other input, and returns results in any format 
in which information related to the requested content can 
be found”; 26 they include for instance the Google search 
engine or Microsoft Bing.
–  Online social networks, which are “platform[s] that 
enabl[e] end users to connect, share, discover and commu-
nicate with each other across multiple devices and, in 
particular, via chats, posts, videos and recommenda-
tions”;27 they include, for instance, Facebook.
21 DMA Proposal, Art.  2(2). Those types of  digital services are also referred to by the 
Commission as “business models”: Commission Staff  Working Document of  25  May 
2016, Online Platforms, SWD(2016) 172 final.
22 An information society service is a service normally provided for remuneration, at a dis-
tance, by electronic means and at the individual request of  a recipient: Directive (EU) 
2015/1535 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  9 September 2015 laying 
down a procedure for the provision of  information in the field of  technical regulations 
and of  rules on Information Society services, OJ L 241, 17.9.2015, p. 1.
23 The DMA Proposal relies on the definition set out in the P2B Regulation, Art. 2(2). 
24 Defined as information society services allowing consumers and/or traders “to conclude 
online sales or service contracts with traders either on the online marketplace’s website or on a 
trader’s website that uses computing services provided by the online marketplace”: Directive 
(EU) 2016/1148 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  6 July 2016 concern-
ing measures for a high common level of  security of  network and information systems 
across the Union, OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1 (hereinafter “Network Information Security 
Directive”) Art. 4(17).
25 Defined as “a type of  online intermediation services, which is focused on software applica-
tions as the intermediated product or service”: DMA Proposal, Art. 2(12).
26 Here as well, the DMA relies on definitions already included in previous enactments: P2B 
Regulation, Art. 2(5) and Network Information Security Directive, Art. 4(18).
27 DMA Proposal, Art. 2(7). This definition is new to the DMA.
–  Video-sharing platform services, which are “services 
where the principal purpose, or an essential function-
ality is the provision of programmes and/or of user-gen-
erated videos to the general public for which the platform 
does not have editorial responsibility but determines the 
organisation of the content”;28 they include, for instance, 
YouTube.
–  Number-independent interpersonal communication 
services, which are “services that enable direct interper-
sonal and interactive exchange of information via elec-
tronic communications networks between a finite number 
of persons (whereby the persons initiating or partici-
pating in the communication determine its recipient) and 
which does not connect with publicly assigned numbering 
resources”;29 they include WhatsApp, Skype or Gmail, 
to name but a few.
–  Cloud computing services, which are information 
society services that enable “access to a scalable and 
elastic pool of shareable computing resources”; 30 they 
include for instance Amazon Web Services (AWS) or 
Microsoft Azure.
–  Operating systems, which are “systems software which 
control the basic functions of the hardware or software 
and enable software applications to run on it”; 31 they 
include for instance Google Android, Apple iOS or 
Microsoft Windows.
–  Advertising services offered by a provider of any of the 
seven core platform services mentioned above including 
ad networks, ad exchanges and any ad intermediation 
services.
8.  Those eight core platform services were selected by 
the Commission because of their following characte-
ristics: extreme economies of scale and scope, impor-
tant network effects, multi-sidedness, possible user 
lock-in and absence of multi-homing, vertical integra-
tion and data-driven advantages. Those characteristics 
are not new in and of themselves, but when they apply 
cumulatively, they lead to market concentration as well 
as dependency and unfairness issues which, according 
to the Commission, cannot be addressed effectively by 
existing EU laws.32 On the basis of such characteris-
tics, the Commission did not select video streaming and 
video-on-demand services such as Netflix because of the 
absence of multi-sidedness, nor B2B industrial platforms 
because of the absence of strong bargaining power asym-
metry which could lead to unfairness. 
9. The DMA proposal also contains a built-in dynamic 
mechanism that allows the European Commission, after 
a so-called market investigation, to propose to the EU 
legislative bodies that the DMA be amended in order 
28 Definition taken from the AVMSD, Art. 1(1aa).
29 Definition taken from the EECC, Art. 2(5) and (7).
30 Definition taken from the Network Information Security Directive, Art. 4(19).
31 DMA Proposal, Art. 2(10). This definition is also new to the DMA.
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to include new digital services in the list of CPSs.33 By 
implication, the list of CPSs is therefore considered to 
form an essential element of the DMA, since it can only 
be expanded through a legislative act.34 In the end, that 
market investigation mechanism to add to the CPS list 
does not add much to the right of legislative initiative 
already entrusted to the Commission by the TEU.35 
3. Criteria to designate
gatekeepers of core platform
services
10. The DMA constitutes asymmetric regulation: its
obligations do not apply to any and all providers of core
platform services, but only to those providers which have
been designated as gatekeepers. Such designation is done
by the European Commission on the basis of a cumu-
lative “three criteria” test, namely: (i) significant impact
on the EU internal market; (ii) control of an important
gateway for business users to reach end-users; and (iii)
entrenched and durable position.36 The gatekeeper desig-
nation is made on an individual firm and individual CPS
basis: it only concerns the CPS(s) for which the firm
meets the “three criteria test” to be designated as gate-
keeper, to the exclusion of other CPSs offered by the
same firm, and a fortiori of other digital services outside
the CPS list. For instance, if  Facebook holds a gatekeeper 
position for social network services, that does not mean
that Facebook will also be designated as a gatekeeper for
its marketplace services.37
11. In order to ease the gatekeeper designation process,
the DMA proposal introduces a rebuttable presump-
tion, for each of the three criteria, in the form of a
threshold. The first criterion (significant impact) will
be deemed fulfilled if  the CPS provider38 achieved an
annual EEA turnover equal to or above €6.5 billion or
a market capitalization of at least €65  billion and that
CPS provider is currently active in at least three Member
States. The second criterion (important gateway) will be
deemed met if  the CPS provider reached, for a specific
CPS, more than 45 million monthly active end-users in
the EU (around 10% of the EU population)39 as well
as more than 10,000 active business users on an annu-
alised basis.40 As for the third criterion (entrenched and
33 DMA Proposal, Art. 17(a).
34 Indeed Art. 290 TFEU provides that delegation is only possible for non-essential elements 
of  the legislative act.
35 TEU, Art. 17(2).
36 DMA Proposal, Art. 3(1).
37 DMA Proposal, Art. 3(7) and recital 29.
38 Or the overall firm to which it belongs, if  the CPS provider is but a division or a subsidiary. 
39 The same criterion is proposed to designate the “very large online platforms,” which are 
subject to additional obligation and a more Europeanised oversight under the DSA: DSA 
Proposal, Art. 25(2).
40 DMA Proposal, Art. 3(2) and recital 23. The Commission could, in a delegated act, clarify 
the methodology to measure the size thresholds in order to ensure legal predictability and 
could also adjust the thresholds: DMA Proposal, Art. 3(5).
durable position), it will be fulfilled if  the user thresh-
olds set above are met for the last three financial years.41 
In practice, a CPS provider should self-assess whether it 
meets those size thresholds and, when it does, it should 
notify the Commission, providing all the relevant infor-
mation within three months.42 On that basis, within two 
months the Commission will designate this CPS provider 
as a gatekeeper unless the provider elects to try to rebut 
the presumption.43 The Commission Impact Assessment 
indicates that the use of those thresholds could result in 
ten to fifteen CPS providers being designated as gate-
keepers, but does not give any explanation for this esti-
mated range.44
12. As just mentioned, a CPS provider that meets the
presumptive thresholds may try to rebut the presump-
tion and demonstrate that the “three criteria test” is
not fulfilled.45 Such rebuttal must rely on an open list
of quantitative and qualitative indicators such as finan-
cial and commercial size, number of users, entry barriers,
scale and scope effects, user lock-in and “other struc-
tural market characteristics.”46 Conversely, if  on the basis
of the same indicators, a CPS provider does fulfil the
“three criteria test” despite falling under the presumptive
thresholds, the Commission may designate that provider
as a gatekeeper.47
13. Table 1 below summarises the “three criteria test” to
designate the gatekeepers, the thresholds for the gate-
keeper presumption and the quantitative and qualitative
indicators that can be used to rebut the presumption or
to designate gatekeepers that are below the thresholds.
41 DMA Proposal, Art. 3(2)(c). The market capitalisation threshold, however, needs only be 
fulfilled for the last financial year.
42 DMA Proposal, Art. 3(3).
43 DMA Proposal, Art. 3(4) and Art. 15(3).
44 Impact Assessment, para. 148. Caffarra and Scott Morton (2021) calculated on a prelim-
inary basis that the thresholds “will capture not only (obviously) the core businesses of  the 
largest players (GAFAM), but perhaps also a few others. Oracle and SAP, for instance, would 
appear to meet the thresholds, as would AWS and Microsoft Azure. Conversely Twitter, Airbnb, 
Bing, LinkedIn, Xbox Netflix, Zoom and Expedia do not appear to meet the thresholds at 
present, and Booking.com, Spotify, Uber, Bytedance/TikTok, Salesforce, Google Cloud and 
IBM Cloud appear to meet some but not others.” However, Oracle and SAP do not appear to 
offer CPS as they do not operate B2C platforms and do not have separate business users 
and end users.
45 DMA Proposal, Art. 3(4).
46 DMA Proposal, Art. 3(6) and recital 25.
47 DMA Proposal, Art. 3(6) and Art. 15. Three or more Member States may request the
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14.  Next to existing gatekeepers, the Commission 
may also designate an emerging gatekeeper when a 
CPS provider meets the first two criteria (i.e., signifi-
cant impact and important gateway) and the fulfilment 
of the third criterion is foreseeable.48 In this case, the 
emerging gatekeeper is subject to a subset of the obliga-
tions imposed on existing gatekeepers, with the aim of 
preventing market tipping.
4. Obligations imposed on core 
platform service gatekeepers
15.  A digital platform that has been designated as a 
gatekeeper for one or several core platform services 
is subject to a table of “18 Commandments” of the 
contemporary prophets Vestager and Breton. Those 
new Commandments are divided into two lists: first, a 
blacklist comprising seven directly applicable detailed 
obligations which are in practice mostly prohibitions; 
and secondly, a grey list comprising eleven more or less 
detailed obligations which may need to be specified by 
the Commission. In principle, both lists apply automati-
cally to all the CPS providers that have been designated 
as gatekeeper independently of their business models. 
In practice, however, half  of the obligations are CPS 
specific. Also, the application of the obligations is limited 
to the CPS for which there has been a gatekeeper desi-
gnation and does not apply to the other CPSs provided 
by the online platform. 
48 DMA Proposal, Art. 15(4), recitals 27 and 63.
16.  The blacklist comprises the following prohibitions 
and obligations:
(a) Refrain from combining personal data sourced from 
the CPS with personal data from other services of the 
gatekeeper or third parties, and from signing in end-users 
to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine 
personal data, unless the end-user has been presented 
with the specific choice and provided meaningful 
consent.49 Such practice has been condemned under 
competition law by the German competition authority 
in Facebook50 and under consumer protection law by the 
Italian Competition and Consumer Authority.51
(b) Allow business users to offer the same services to 
end-users through third-party intermediation services on 
different terms and conditions than those offered through 
the gatekeeper CPS.52 Such clauses have been condemned 
in Amazon E-book,53 or in several Online hotel booking 
cases.54
49 DMA Proposal, Art. 5(a).
50 https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/
Pressemitteilungen/2019/07_02_2019_Facebook.html. This decision is under appeal, 
waiting for the answer by the Court of  Justice to a preliminary question raised by the 
German appeal Court on the GDPR and its relationship with competition law.




52 DMA Proposal, Art. 5(b). This provision complements P2B Regulation, Art. 10.
53 Commission Decision of  4 May 2017, case AT.40153 – Amazon E-books.
54 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/hotel_monitoring_report_en.pdf.
Table 1. Criteria, thresholds and indicators to designate gatekeepers
“ Three criteria 
test”
Presumptive size thresholds
Quantitative and qualitative 
gatekeeper indicators
1. Significant 
impact on the 
internal market
Financial and geographical size
(at firm level)
–  Annual EEA Turnover (last 3 years) > €6.5 bn 
or Market cap (last year) > €65 bn
–  and currently provides one CPS in at least 
3 Member States
Size, operation and position
–  Very high turnover derived from end-users 
of a single CPS
– Very high market capitalisation
– Very high ratio of equity value over profit
–  High growth rates, or decelerating growth rates 
coupled with increased profitability
2. Important 
gateway to reach 
end-users
User size (at CPS level)
– Monthly EU active end-users > 45 m
– and yearly EU active business users > 10,000
Users
– Number of end-users
– Number of dependent business users
– User lock-in, lack of multi-homing
3. Entrenched and 
durable position CPS user thresholds met for the last 3 years
Entry barriers
– Network effects, data-driven advantages
– Economies of scale and scope (incl. from data)
– Vertical integration
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(c) On the one hand, allow business users to promote 
offers to end-users acquired via the CPS and to conclude 
contracts with these end-users regardless of whether for 
that purpose they use the gatekeeper CPS (prohibition 
of anti-steering clause) and, on the other hand, allow 
end-users to access, through the gatekeeper CPS, content, 
subscriptions, features or other items by using the apps 
of a business user, where these items have been acquired 
by the end-users from the relevant business user without 
using the gatekeeper CPS.55 The legality of such a clause 
under competition law is currently being reviewed in 
Apple App Store.56
(d) Restricting business users from raising issues related 
to gatekeeper practices with public authorities.57
(e) Refrain from bundling the gatekeeper CPS with iden-
tification services.58
(f) Refrain from bundling several CPSs covered by a gate-
keeper designation.59 Such bundling was prohibited in 
Google Android.60 As the obligation only concerns CPSs 
covered by a gatekeeper designation,61 it does not prohibit 
the gatekeeper from entering new markets (especially if  
doing so from scratch, as opposed to an acquisition).62
(g) Provide advertisers and publishers with information 
concerning the price paid by the advertiser and publisher 
and remuneration paid to the publisher.63 Such lack of 
transparency is currently investigated in Google Ad Tech.64
17.  The grey list comprises the following eleven prohi-
bitions and obligations, which may need to be specified 
further by the Commission for each designated gatekeeper:
(a)  Refrain from using, in competition with business 
users, any data not publicly available which is gener-
ated or provided to the gatekeeper when these business 
users or their customers use the CPS.65 Such practice 
is currently under scrutiny in Amazon Marketplace.66
(b)  Allow end-users to uninstall preinstalled apps on its 
CPS.67 This issue was central to Microsoft (tying) and 
Google Android.68
55 DMA Proposal, Art. 5(c). This provision complements P2B Regulation, Art. 10.
56 Case AT.40437 – Apple – App Store Practices (music streaming).
57 DMA Proposal, Art. 5(d). 
58 DMA Proposal, Art. 5(e). Even though there is no actual case on this, a number of  studies 
have pointed to the practices of  Facebook and Google on this issue. 
59 DMA Proposal, Art. 5(f).
60 Commission Decision of  18 July 2018, case AT.40099 – Google Android. This case is under 
appeal at the General Court in Google v. Commission, case T-604/18.
61 Compare with Electronic Communications Regulation, where the regulator may impose 
obligations beyond the SMP designation: Art. 63(3) EECC.
62 Which is an important force of  competition as shown by Petit (2020).
63 DMA Proposal, Art. 5(g).
64 Cases AT. 40660 and AT.40670. See Geradin and Katsifis (2020).
65 DMA Proposal, Art. 6(1)(a). This provision complements P2B Regulation, Art. 9.
66 Case AT.40462 – Amazon Marketplace.
67 DMA Proposal, Art. 6(1)(b).
68 Commission Decision of  16 December 2009, case  AT.39530 – Microsoft – Tying and 
Commission Decision of  18 July 2018, case AT.40099 – Google Android.
(c)  Allow the use of third-party apps and app stores using 
or interoperating with the OS of the gatekeeper and 
allow these apps and app stores to be accessed by 
means other than the gatekeeper CPS (sideloading).69 
This practice is at the core of Apple App Store.70
(d)  Refrain from ranking its own products and services 
more favourably than competing third-party product 
and services and conduct ranking under fair and 
non-discriminatory conditions.71 This form of 
self-preferencing was prohibited in Google Shopping72 
and is now under investigation in Amazon Buy Box.73
(e)  Refrain from technically restricting the ability of 
end-users to switch between different apps and 
services to be accessed with the OS of the gatekeeper.74 
(f)  Allow business users and providers of ancillary 
services access to and interoperability with the same 
features that are used by the CPS gatekeeper in 
providing ancillary services.75 This other form of 
self-preferencing is analysed in Apple Pay.76 This obli-
gation imposes interoperability between complemen-
tary services but not between substitute services, as 
provided in the EECC for interpersonal communica-
tions app such as WhatsApp or Skype.77
(g)  Provide advertisers and publishers, free of charge, 
access to the performance measuring tools of the gate-
keeper and the information necessary to carry out their 
own independent verification of the ad inventory.78 
(h)  Provide effective, continuous and real-time portability 
of data generated through the activity of a business 
user or its end-user, in particular for end-users to 
facilitate the exercise of data portability.79 This obli-
gation extends the portability requirement of the 
GDPR by widening its scope to non-personal data as 
well as data generated by business users.80
69 DMA Proposal, Art. 6(1)(c).
70 Case AT.40716 – Apple – App Store Practices.
71 DMA Proposal, Art.  6(1)(d). This provision complements P2B Regulation, Art. 5 and 
Commission Guidelines of  7 December 2020 on ranking transparency pursuant to Regulation 
(EU) 2019/1150 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council, OJ C 424, 8.12.2020, p. 1. 
72 Commission Decision of  27 June 2017, case AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping). This 
case is under appeal at the General Court in Google v. Commission, case T-612/17.
73 Case AT.40703 – Amazon – Buy Box.
74 DMA Proposal, Art. 6(1)(e). There is no publicly known precedent for this obligation.
75 DMA Proposal, Art. 6(1)(f).
76 Case AT.40452 – Apple – Mobile payments. The Commission also refers to German legislation on 
the topic, as well as an Italian investigation into Google Maps and a Dutch case on NFC access. 
77 EECC, Art. 61(2)(c), which allows the national competent authorities may also impose on 
the providers of  number-independent interpersonal communications services obligations 
to make their services interoperable, including by relying on standards, if  (i) those provid-
ers reach a significant level of  coverage and user uptake; (ii) the Commission has found an 
appreciable threat to end-to-end connectivity between end-users and has adopted imple-
menting measures specifying the nature and scope of  any obligations that may be imposed 
by the national authorities; and (iii) the obligations imposed are necessary and propor-
tionate to ensure interoperability of  interpersonal communications services.
78 DMA Proposal, Art. 6(1)(g).
79 DMA Proposal, Art. 6(1)(h). For an economic rationale of  such extensive data portability 
obligation, see Krämer (2020).
80 GDPR, Art. 20 and Guidelines of  13 April 2017 of  Working Party 29 on the right to data 
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(i)  Provide business users, free of charge, with effective, 
high-quality, continuous and real-time access to data 
that is provided for or generated in the context of 
gatekeeper CPS use by those business users and their 
end-users.81
(j)  Provide any third-party providers of online search 
engines with access on FRAND terms to ranking, 
query, click and view data in relation to search gener-
ated by end-users on online search engines of the 
gatekeeper.82
(k)  Apply FRAND conditions, which can be assessed 
with different benchmarking methods, for the access 
by business users to app stores.83
81 DMA Proposal, Art. 6(1)(i). This question also seems to play a role in AT.40716 – Apple – 
App Store Practices.
82 DMA Proposal, Art. 6(1)(j) and Art. 7(6). For an economic rationale of  such obligation, 
see Krämer, Schnurr and Broughton Micova (2020) and Prüfer and Schottmüller (2020). 
There is no known precedent for such an obligation.
83 DMA Proposal, Art. 6(1)(k) and Art. 7(6). The Commission alludes to ongoing investi-
gations relating to Apple practices in relation to its App Store. Recital 57 provides that: 
“The following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of  general 
access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by 
other providers of  software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the 
provider of  the software application store for different related or similar services or to different 
types of  end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of  the software appli-
cation store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions 
imposed by the provider of  the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper 
offers to itself.”
18.  Although those obligations apply directly to the 
designated gatekeepers, they may be specified by the 
Commission in a regulatory dialogue with the gatekeeper. 
Such specification may be done at the Commission’s 
initiative when assessing the measures taken by the gate-
keeper. It may also be done at the gatekeeper’s request 
which, on this occasion, can notify the Commission of 
specific measures to implement the obligations.84 The 
specification should be done on the basis of two princi-
ples: (i) the effectiveness of the measures in achieving the 
objectives of the obligation and (ii) the proportionality 
of the measures given the specific circumstances of the 
CPS and the gatekeeper.85
84 DMA Proposal, Art. 7(2) and (7) respectively.








Denial of access 
to platforms and data
–  No tying to business users from CPS to ID 
services (Art. 5(e))
– No tying from CPS to other CPS (Art. 5(f))
–  No use of data related to business users to 
compete against them (Art. 6(1)(a))
– No self-preferencing in rankings (Art. 6(1)(d))
–  Access to and interoperability with OS for third 
parties on same terms as proprietary ancillary 
services (Art. 6(1)(f))
–  Allow “sideloading”(interoperability) of third-
party apps or app stores, unless threatens 
integrity (Art. 6(1)(c))
–  Provide free of charge real-time data sharing 
for business users (Art. 6(1)(i))
–  Provide FRAND access to click-and-query data 




– No wide MFN/parity clauses (Art. 5(b))
– No anti-steering clauses (Art. 5(c))
–  Allow uninstalling of apps, unless essential to 
OS/device (Art. 6(1)(b))
–  Device neutrality: No technical restriction of 
switching or multi-homing across apps using 
OS (Art. 6(1)(e))
–  Provide real-time data portability for end-users 
(Art. 6(1)(h))
Unfair sensu stricto
– No data fusion without user consent 
(Art. 5(a))
–  No bar to user complaints to public 
authorities (Art. 5(d))
–  FRAND access to app stores (Art. 6(1)(k))
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19.  The Commission services explain that the new 
18  Commandments were selected because they “are 
considered unfair by taking into account the features of the 
digital sector and where experience gained, for example 
in the enforcement of the EU competition rules, shows 
that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the 
business users and end users.”86 The selection is thus back-
ward-looking. However, in order to be future proof as 
well, a flexibility clause provides that the Commission 
has the power to add new obligations ensuring market 
contestability and B2B fairness.87 The Commission can 
do that via a delegated act (and thus without having to 
initiate the lengthy and complex legislative procedure) 
after having carried out a so-called market investigation 
which could last 24 months. The DMA proposal indi-
cates that those new obligations may be necessary when a 
designated gatekeeper engages in courses of conduct that 
are unfair or that limit the contestability of the CPS, but 
without such courses of conduct being explicitly covered 
by the lists of obligations.88
20.  In order to better understand the underlying logic 
of the long lists of obligations imposed on gatekee-
pers, Table 2 attempts to present the 18 Commandments 
according to four possible theories of harm to market 
contestability or fairness: (i) lack of transparency; (ii) 
on the supply side of the market, bundling, self-prefe-
rencing or denial of access to gatekeepers’ platforms and 
data; (iii) on the demand side, lack of mobility (multi-ho-
ming and switching) of business users and end-users; and 
(iv) lack of balance (unfairness) between the rights and 
obligations of the gatekeepers and their business users. 
The first three theories relate to harm to market contes-
tability and value creation (longer-term efficiency) while 
the fourth theory relates to fairness and value distribu-
tion. Table 2 also shows that most obligations relate to 
the contestability objective while only a few relate to the 
fairness objective.
21. As explained above, the full suite of 18 Commandments 
automatically applies after a gatekeeper designation 
without the possibility for the Commission to select the 
most appropriate ones on the basis of the proportiona-
lity principle and given the characteristics of the gate-
keepers. Moreover, there is no possibility for the gate-
keeper to rely on an efficiency defence to escape the 
imposition of an obligation, as is the case under compe-
tition law.89 The DMA proposal only provides for two 
very narrow escape clauses. First, the application of the 
obligations may be suspended at the request of a gate-
keeper when the economic viability of its operations in 
the EU is at risk due to exceptional circumstances beyond 
the control of the gatekeeper.90 The Commission Impact 
86 Impact Assessment, para. 153. Also DMA Proposal, recital 33.
87 DMA Proposal, Arts. 10 and 17(b).
88 DMA Proposal, recital 66.
89 Guidance of  3 December 2008 on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying 
Article [102 TFUE] to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 
24.2.2009, p. 7, at paras. 28–31.
90 DMA Proposal, Art. 8.
Assessment gives the example of an unforeseen external 
shock that temporarily eliminates a significant part of 
end-user demand for the relevant core platform service.91 
Thus, the possibility of suspension only provides for a 
very narrow objective justification. Second, gatekeepers 
may be exempted, at their request or at the Commission’s 
initiative, from some obligations in order to protect the 
public interest regarding morality, health and security.92
22. Next to the black and grey lists, gatekeepers are also 
subject to two additional specific transparency obli-
gations, this time vis-à-vis the European Commission. 
First, they must inform the Commission of any intended 
acquisition of a provider of information society 
services.93 This obligation, which goes further than the 
notification requirement imposed under the Merger 
Regulation,94 aims to allow the Commission to review 
gatekeeper designation on the basis of new acquisitions 
by the gatekeepers (and possibly extend the designation 
to other CPSs) as well as to monitor contestability trends 
in digital markets.95 It may also allow the Commission 
to nudge national competition authorities to refer to 
the Commission mergers falling below the EU jurisdic-
tional thresholds, pursuant to Article 22 of the Merger 
Regulation.96 Secondly, gatekeepers must submit to the 
Commission an independently audited description of 
consumer profiling techniques used in providing the CPS 
for which a gatekeeper designation applies.97 This obliga-
tion, which goes further than the transparency and audit 
requirements of the GDPR,98 aims to allow more privacy 
competition between substitute CPSs and, in turn, to 
prevent that deep consumer profiling would become the 
industry standard.99
5. Institutional design
23. To enforce the 18 Commandments, the DMA proposal 
puts forwards a centralised model at the EU level. 
It  would confer fully-fledged regulatory powers to the 
European Commission, empowering it to: (i) designate 
the gatekeepers; (ii) specify, when needed, the obligations 
imposed on them; (iii) monitor compliance; (iv) sanction 
gatekeepers in case of non-compliance; (v) adapt, with 
delegated acts, the size thresholds for gatekeeper designa-
tion and the list of obligations to which gatekeepers are 
subject; and (vi) conduct market investigations that could 
lead to gatekeeper designations, to the extension of the 
91 Impact Assessment, para. 400.
92 DMA Proposal, Art. 9.
93 DMA Proposal, Art. 12.
94 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of  20 January 2004 on the control of  concentra-
tions between undertakings, OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1, Art. 1.
95 DMA Proposal, recital 31.
96 Commission Guidance of  26 March 2021 on the application of  the referral mechanism 
set out in Article 22 of  the Merger Regulation to certain categories of  cases, OJ C 113, 
31.3.2021, p. 1.
97 DMA Proposal, Art. 13.
98 GDPR, Art. 13.
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DMA to new CPSs, to the addition of new obligations 
to the 18 Commandments, or to gatekeeper sanctions for 
systematic non-compliance.
24. Conversely, the role of the Member States and their
national authorities is more limited than in other fields of
EU law. Member State representatives are merely grouped 
into a new comitology-type committee called the Digital
Markets Advisory Committee (DMAC).100 The DMAC
would provide non-binding advice to the Commission
on the implementing decisions.101 Moreover, if  the
Commission proceeds with a delegated act to add new
obligations to the Commandments, the standard formula 
for dual control by the Member States applies: before
the adoption of the act, representatives of the Member
States should be consulted by the Commission, and after
the adoption of the act, the Council of Ministers of the
EU may oppose such act.102
6. Oversight and enforcement
25. In the proposal, DMA enforcement is modelled on
antitrust enforcement,103 hence it is mostly bilateral
(between the Commission and a single firm) and at times
adversarial. Enforcement steps are the following. First,
the Commission designates a gatekeeper, either with a
simple and quick test (on the basis of the presumptive
thresholds) or with a more complex and slower process
(after a market investigation). The Commission may
specify the obligations of the grey list in a regulatory
dialogue with the regulated gatekeeper.
26. Secondly, for each gatekeeper designation, the
Commission, possibly supported by external experts,104
monitors the correct application of the obligations by
the gatekeeper in question. To do that, the Commission
would enjoy extensive investigation powers, such as
requests for information, including access to databases
and algorithms, interviews and on-site inspections.105
During its investigations, the Commission should respect
due process principles towards the gatekeeper: right to
be heard, access to the file and respect for professional
secrecy.106
27. Thirdly, should a gatekeeper be found prima facie in
non-compliance, the Commission may impose interim
measures, in case of serious and irreparable damage to
the users of the gatekeeper.107 Later in the procedure, the
Commission may also accept and make binding
100 DMA Proposal, Art. 32.
101  Those decisions relate to designation of  gatekeepers; suspension and exemption of  obliga-
tions; imposition of  interim measures; acceptance of  gatekeeper commitments; and sanc-
tions for non-compliance or systematic non-compliance.
102 DMA Proposal, Art. 37(4) and (6).
103 As explained in Impact Assessment, paras. 198, 218.
104 DMA Proposal, Art. 24.
105 Resp. DMA Proposal, Arts. 19, 20 and 21.
106 Resp. DMA Proposal, Arts. 30 and 31.
107 DMA Proposal, Art. 22.
commitments offered by the gatekeeper to ensure 
compliance with its DMA obligations.108 Alternatively, 
the Commission may issue a cease-and-desist order and 
fines up to 10% of worldwide turnover as well as periodic 
penalty payments.109 
28. Fourthly, in case of systematic non-compliance—
namely (i)  three non-compliance decisions within five
years and (ii) the strengthening or extension of the
gatekeeper position—the Commission may go further





29. The DMA rests on three main concepts, namely, a list 
of “core platform services” (its material scope of appli-
cation), “gatekeepers” (the firms that are subject to the
DMA) and a list of obligations imposed on gatekeepers
of core platform services. The DMA proposal features
three types of market investigation, all of which are to
be conducted by the Commission, that relate to each of
these concepts respectively: (i) the first type of market
investigation would allow the Commission to designate
a gatekeeper on the basis of a series of quantitative and
qualitative indicators; (ii) the second type would lead to
behavioural and, if  necessary, structural remedies when a
gatekeeper systematically refuses or fails to comply with
the obligations and prohibitions; (iii) the third type would 
provide the foundation for extending the scope of appli-
cation (i.e., adding new CPSs to the list) and adding to the 
list of obligations contained in the DMA. In practice, the 
market investigations are flexibility clauses to adapt the
DMA to the evolution of technologies and markets or
to factor in additional enforcement experience. However,
using a single and common “market investigation” label
for all three types of flexibility clauses in sector-specific
regulation is a misnomer111 because they have little in
common with the antitrust market investigations existing
in some jurisdictions such as the UK and, furthermore,
because each of them concerns a specific type of flexi-
bility, different from the others.
108 DMA Proposal, Art. 23.
109 DMA Proposal, Arts. 25–29.
110 DMA Proposal, Art. 16.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































30. After having reviewed the main elements of the
Digital Markets proposal, this section aims to propose
improvements to each of those elements to ensure that
the new law will be effective in increasing contestability
and fairness in the digital economy and contribute to the
Digital Single Market.
1. Objectives and principles
1.1 Contestability and fairness 
31. The objective of market contestability is consistent
with the main concerns which have been raised by many
recent reports on the functioning of digital markets. The
goal is not to protect business users, complementors
or competitors of the digital gatekeepers as such, but
rather to protect the competitive process in the digital
economy. This is in line with the ordo-liberal tradition
of Europe112 and has been a standard objective of several
EU economic laws, including competition law. However,
over the last twenty years, competition policy has tended
to favour more short-term effects (both harms and effi-
ciencies) over long-term consequences (on competi-
tion or innovation). Such evolution has multiple causes,
including the static bias induced by increased reliance on
economic theories that focus on available and measurable 
static data, and the raising of the standard of proof which 
makes the demonstrations of long-term effects more
difficult.113 The DMA aims to reverse this short-term bias 
embodied in recent competition law by heralding a return 
to protecting contestability and the competitive process
as such, possibly independently of short-term efficien-
cies, thereby giving more importance to long-term effects. 
32. The objective of B2B fairness is consistent with the
national traditions of many Member States,114 but less
present at the European level.115 Indeed EU economic
regulation in general has tended, so far, to leave distribu-
tional issues on the sidelines. Competition law, in partic-
ular, prioritises exclusionary abuses over exploitative
abuses, even though Article 102 TFEU explicitly extends
to exploitation. This may be justified as the heterogeneity
of preferences among Member States is higher for distri-
butional issues than for (short- or long-term) efficiency
issues. However, as digital markets may lead to significant 
unfairness across all the Member States, a fairness objec-
tive may be justified, provided it is very well crafted and
does not lead to legal uncertainty or regulatory creep.
112  Eucken (1992), Gerber (1998). For an attempt to rejuvenate this line of  analysis in the 
context of  the digital economy, see Schinkel and Larouche (2014).
113 Federico et al. (2019).
114 See Renda et al. (2014) for analysis of  national B2B fairness law in the Member States.
115 Stuyck (2011).
1.2 Harmonisation and the interplay 
between the DMA and national 
competition law
33. While the DMA proposal prohibits the Member
States from imposing further obligations on designated
gatekeepers for the purpose of ensuring contestable and
fair markets, it does not impede Member States from
imposing obligations on the basis of EU or national
competition rules.116 Specifically, any obligation imposed
on designated gatekeepers via national competition law
is allowed, provided this is compatible with Regulation
(EC) No. 1/2003.117 For instance, the parallel imposi-
tion of obligations under the DMA and under the newly
adopted Section  19a of German Competition Act,118
which targets similar platforms, is possible. Such parallel
imposition, at best, undermines the internal market and,
at worst, leads to incompatibility.
34.  In order to avoid such pitfalls, a good coordination
between the Commission as a DMA enforcer and the
NCAs is essential. However, there is no obvious existing
forum where such coordination should take place. In parti-
cular, the European Competition Network and the coor-
dination mechanisms of Regulation (EC) No.  1/2003
would not necessarily be appropriate, because according
to the Commission proposal the DMA is deemed not to
be a competition law tool. Thus, a new cooperation forum
should be established, where the Commission and the
NCAs (possibly with other independent national authori-
ties) could meet to discuss the enforcement of the DMA.
Such forum would reduce the risk of divergent or incompa-
tible decisions adopted by the Commission under the DMA 
and by an NCA under competition law. Such forum would
also, as explained below, allow the NCAs to bring their
expertise and legitimacy in support of DMA enforcement.
35. While the establishment of a cooperation forum
between the Commission and the NCAs may reduce the
risks of divergent or incompatible decisions, it may not
alleviate it completely. Therefore, a conflict rule needs to
be in place. In that regard, a narrow rule based on the
concrete actions of the respective authorities is prefe-
rable to an absolute hierarchical rule based on “fields”
or “competences.”119 On that basis, both competition
law and the DMA could apply concurrently, unless their
concurrent application puts the designated gatekeeper
in a situation where it cannot comply with both regimes
at the same time. For instance, this could be the case if
the Commission imposes under the DMA some form of
116 DMA Proposal, Art. 1(6).
117  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of  16 December 2002 on the implementation of
the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of  the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, 
p. 1, as amended, Art. 3(2) provides that “Member States shall not under this Regulation 
be precluded from adopting and applying on their territory stricter national laws which pro-
hibit or sanction unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings.”
118  See Section 19a of  the German Competition Act (GWB), concerning abusive conduct of
firms of  paramount significance for competition across markets. A non-official English 
translation is available at https://www.d-kart.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/GWB-
2021-01-14-engl.pdf.
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data portability while a national competition authority 
imposes another form of data portability. There would 
on the other hand be no conflict if, under one regime, the 
gatekeeper platform is put under a regulatory obligation, 
whereas under the other regime, the conclusion was that 
no obligation should be imposed. In such a situation, the 
platform can comply with both regimes. To the extent that 
the two regimes are complementary, there should not be 
any significant proportionality issue, since the respective 
interventions of each authority are presumably necessary 
and proportionate to the aims of the respective regimes. 
36. Should a firm find itself  in a position where it cannot
comply with one regime without breaching the other,
then we would suggest the following conflict rule. Our
starting point is the preservation of the single market
(which is the objective of the DMA) while respecting
the EU legal hierarchy (i.e., EU competition law prevails
over the DMA, but national competition law going
further than EU law does not prevail over the DMA).
Therefore, in case of an incompatibility between an obli-
gation imposed by the Commission under the DMA,
which applies across the EU, and a contradictory remedy
imposed by an NCA under national competition law,
which applies only to one Member State, the DMA obli-
gation should prevail. Alternatively, the same outcome
could be reached through the principle of sincere coope-
ration of Article 4 TEU, in that a Member State cannot
impose an obligation that undermines EU law. Thus,
should a national competition authority impose to a
designated gatekeeper an obligation that contradicts the
DMA, the gatekeeper could refuse to implement such
obligation by claiming that the Member State violates
EU law by imposing such obligation.120
2. Definition of core
platform services and criteria
to designate gatekeepers
2.1 Definition of core platform services
37. “Core platform services” are not defined in the DMA
proposal, which merely contains a list of service types,
many of which are defined in other EU instruments. On
the positive side, the DMA proposal seeks to build on
existing legislative definitions, and therefore avoids rein-
venting the wheel. On the negative side, these definitions
were elaborated over many years, in instruments that are
not always entirely consistent with one another: throwing 
them in the “core platform services” basket may not
provide much guidance. A general characterisation of
CPS can be found in the recitals of the proposal: core
platform services feature economies of scale, negligible
marginal costs, strong network effects, multi-sidedness,
user dependency, lock-in, lack of multi-homing, vertical
integration and data-driven competitive advantages.121 It
120  CJEC, 9 September 2003, Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF), case  C-198/01,
EU:C:2003:430.
121 DMA Proposal, recitals 2 and 12.
is not clear why this general definition was not included 
directly in Article 2 as a chapeau to the list. Furthermore, 
not all services listed in Article 2(2) necessarily feature all 
these characteristics. In particular, several CPSs are not 
two-sided, such as number-independent interpersonal 
communication services and cloud computing services, 
and other CPSs are in themselves essentially one-sided 
because the other “side” comprises another CPS.122 
The notion of “core platform services” might therefore 
not age very well.
2.2 The criteria to define 
gatekeeper power
38. There is no clear definition of gatekeeper in EU law,
although the European institutions have used the term
in antitrust123 and regulatory contexts.124 Caffarra and
Scott Morton (2021) define “gatekeeper” as “an interme-
diary who essentially controls access to critical constitu-
encies on either side of a platform that cannot be reached
otherwise, and as a result can engage in conduct and impose 
rules that counterparties cannot avoid.” The definition can 
be made broader by including cases of economic depen-
dency. For instance, according to the Expert Group for
the Observatory on the Online Platform Economy (2020), 
dependence occurs “if and to the extent that the business
faces a high cost from switching away from the platform
to a substitute. Such switching costs can arise for instance
if a business has made significant platform-specific invest-
ments, such as building its technology to be compatible
with the platform’s specification; these investments would
have to be written down (‘sunk costs’) and new invest-
ments made if the business were to switch to a substitute.
Switching costs can also arise from the fact that any substi-
tutes are far inferior, such as when a single platform is a
gatekeeper to a given market or market segment, and there
are few other means of reaching that market or segment.” 
39. The “three criteria test” and the associated indicators
are in line with the concepts of gatekeepers and depen-
dencies. It is true that the test does not explicitly mention
market power or dominant position (as no relevant
market needs to be defined in the designation process)
but the second and third criteria implicitly include the
presence of market power, and several indicators to rebut
the presumption are also linked to market power.125
122  For instance, the other “side” of  a search engine is advertising services. A platform with 
both of  these functions can be seen as two-sided and will have both multiple end-users 
and multiple business users. But it is less obvious that this is true of  each function con-
sidered in isolation. This may also be true of  social networks, video-sharing platform 
services and operating systems.
123  For instance, in case COMP/M.2876 – NewsCorp/Telepiù, para. 198, the Commission con-
sidered the merging parties would have been “the ‘gatekeeper’ of  a tool (Videoguard CAS) that 
may facilitate entry for any alternative pay DTH operator and of  an infrastructure (the plat-
form) that may ease the conditions for the broadcasting of  pay and free TV satellite channels.”
124  Explanatory Memorandum of  the Commission Proposal for a Regulation on pro-
moting fairness and transparency for business users of  online intermediation services, 
COM(2018) 238  final, 26 April 2018: “This growing intermediation of  transactions 
through online platforms, combined with strong indirect network effects that can be fuelled 
by data-driven advantages by the online platforms, lead to an increased dependency of  busi-
nesses on online platforms as quasi ‘gatekeepers’ to markets and consumers.”
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40. However, the three criteria test for gatekeeper desig-
nation risks of being over-inclusive which, in turn, may
strain the monitoring and the enforcement process as well 
as negatively impact the relevance and the strength of the 
prohibitions and obligations.126 In drafting the proposal,
the Commission services envisaged a stricter test which
would require the gatekeeper to provide at least two CPSs 
(instead of merely one, as finally proposed).127 This addi-
tional condition would have led to a more limited number 
of regulated platforms, estimated to be between 5 and 7
(instead of 10–15 under the DMA proposal). This would
have the advantage of focusing the DMA on the most
obvious and pressing contestability issues.128
2.3 The indicators to designate 
the gatekeepers
41. The reliance on presumptive thresholds, which are rela-
tively easy to ascertain, will incentivise the digital platforms
trying to rebut the presumption to disclose the quantitative
and qualitative indicators that they know better than the
Commission. However, it should be clear that these thresholds 
are only based on size and that size is not directly linked to
gatekeeper power. In particular, the size of a platform, which
is often multi-product, is not necessarily correlated with the
size of the CPS itself, let alone the size of the CPS in Europe. 
Also, the mere number of users of a CPS does not necessa-
rily reflect the control of a gateway. Gateway power derives
more from the incentive and the ability of users to switch
or multi-home between competing platforms than from the
mere number of users.129 This is why it should be possible to 
rebut the presumption.130 The list of quantitative and qual-
itative indicators that can be used to rebut the presump-
tion—or to designate as gatekeeper firms that fall below the
presumptive thresholds—are sound and reflect the (admit-
tedly limited) economic literature on gatekeepers. However, 
it is regrettable that the absence of multi-homing, which is a
key indicator of gatekeeper position131 is only mentioned in
a recital (25) of the DMA proposal and not in Article 3(6).
Also, as the gatekeeper concept is new in EU law and the
list of indicators proposed in the DMA remains open, the
Commission could enhance legal predictability by adopting 
guidelines on the way it will use and assess those indicators.132
126 Geradin (2021).
127 Impact Assessment, paras. 148 and 388.
128  Indeed, as recognised in the DMA proposal: “As gatekeepers frequently provide the port-
folio of  their services as part of  an integrated ecosystem to which third-party providers of  
such ancillary services do not have access, at least not subject to equal conditions, and can 
link the access to the core platform service to take-up of  one or more ancillary services, the 
gatekeepers are likely to have an increased ability and incentive to leverage their gatekeeper 
power from their core platform services to these ancillary services, to the detriment of  choice 
and contestability of  these services.”: DMA Proposal, recital 14.
129 Cabral et al. (2021) and Geradin (2021).
130  In that regard the wording of  the Impact Assessment, which mentions (at para. 389) 
that the gatekeeper presumption could only be rebutted in very exceptional circumstanc-
es, is unfortunate.
131 As explained Cabral et al.(2021).
132  Those guidelines are often adopted in competition law and in some sectoral regulation. 
See, for instance, Commission Guidelines of  27 April 2018 on market analysis and the 
assessment of  significant market power under the EU regulatory framework for elec-
tronic communications networks and services, OJ C 159, 7.5.2018, p. 1. However, those 
guidelines are usually based on past administrative practice and case law, neither of  
which are yet developed for the legal concept of  gatekeeper.
3. Obligations imposed
on gatekeepers of core platform
services
3.1 General flexibility: 
Replacing the market investigation 
with principle-based obligations
42. The DMA proposal combines detailed rules for the
existing obligations (in order to facilitate and speed up
the enforcement) with broad discretion in adding new
obligations (in order to adapt the DMA to rapid tech-
nological and market evolution). While flexibility in the
DMA is necessary, especially because the obligations are
very detailed, relying on so-called market investigations
to update the obligation list may not be ideal for several
reasons. On the one hand, a two-year process may be too
long given the rapid evolution of the markets.133 On the
other hand, the procedure may give too much discre-
tion to the Commission. An alternative approach that
is quicker and with clearer constraints could be prefer-
able and the regulatory design of the Unfair Commercial
Practice Directive (UCPD)134 may be a source of inspi-
ration. To fight unfair practices, the UCPD contains a
list of 35 detailed practices which are self-executing
(27 misleading practices and 8 aggressive practices)135
but  also a more general definition of misleading and
aggressive practices allowing the enforcer to catch new
practices not (yet) identified in the list.136
43. Transposing this regulatory design to the DMA,
a new provision could be included—after the detailed
obligations (in Articles  5 and 6)—with a more prin-
ciple-based prohibition.137 This new provision could
include a more generic prohibition of conduct having the
object of the effect of limiting users switching or multi-
homing. It  could also include a more generic prohibi-
tion of conduct aiming at enveloping existing or poten-
tial competitors through bundling and self-prefer-
encing. Moreover, to reduce the risks of over-regulation
in applying those new generically defined prohibitions,
a gatekeeper should be able to bring forward a defence
133  Especially since the Commission is likely to be drawn into extensive formal or informal 
discussions before and during the market investigation, sometimes with the intent of  de-
railing the process given the firm two-year deadline at DMA, Art. 17.
134  Directive 2005/29/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  11 May 2005 
concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market, 
OJ L  149, 11.6.2005, p.  22, as amended by Directive (EU) 2019/2161 (hereinafter 
“UCPD”).
135  UCPD, Annex I.
136  UCPD, Art. 6(1) states: “A commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading if  it con-
tains false information and is therefore untruthful or in any way, including overall presen-
tation, deceives or is likely to deceive the average consumer, even if the information is fac-
tually correct, in relation to one or more of  the [key elements listed in the Directive], and 
in either case causes or is likely to cause him to take a transactional decision that he would 
not have taken otherwise.” UCPD, Art. 8 states: “A commercial practice shall be regarded 
as aggressive if, in its factual context, taking account of  all its features and circumstances, 
by harassment, coercion, including the use of  physical force, or undue influence, it signifi-
cantly impairs or is likely to significantly impair the average consumer’s freedom of  choice 
or conduct with regard to the product and thereby causes him or is likely to cause him to 
take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise.”
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that its conduct does not harm market contestability and 
fairness and, therefore, should not be prohibited. 
44. Those principle-based prohibitions could replace the
proposed Article 10, which is too open-ended and slow.
However, if  the proposed Article  10 were to be main-
tained, it could at least be made more symmetric, so as to
allow the Commission not only to add but also to remove 
obligations if  regulatory experience, market develop-
ments or technological evolution make existing obliga-
tions either no longer relevant or no longer effective and




of the grey list obligations
45. The DMA proposal provides that the whole list of
18 Commandments applies directly and to all designated
gatekeepers independently of their characteristics and
business models. Thus, there is no explicit individua-
lisation of the obligations per gatekeeper. This stands
in contrast with the CMA Digital Markets Taskforce
Advice to the UK government.138 Moreover, the regulated 
gatekeeper cannot rely on an explicit efficiency defence
or objective justification to escape the obligations.139 In
the Impact Assessment, the Commission services explain
that no room was left for efficiency defences because they
“are often one-sided and do not seem to match the evidence
underlying this Impact Assessment including the calls for
regulation raised by an overwhelming majority of respon-
dents to the [open public consultations]. [They] have
also been rejected by the Courts as being unfounded.”140
To be sure, there are two implicit and indirect possibil-
ities of individualisation. First, half  of the obligations
only apply to some types of CPS (in particular market-
places, app stores, search engines, operating systems and
ad-tech services). Secondly, the grey list obligations may
be specified by the Commission according to the charac-
teristics of the CPS and the gatekeeper.141 In this spec-
ification process which takes place in dialogue with the
gatekeeper and which is to be carried out on the basis
of the principles of effectiveness and proportionality, the
Commission may individualise the obligations.
46. However, the specification process of Article 7 could
be improved by making the possible individualisation
outcomes more explicit, and by clarifying the role of the
gatekeepers as well as their business users in the process.
For instance, the process could be as follows:142 (i) first, the 
designated gatekeeper proposes measures to implement
the different obligations; (ii) then the Commission tests
138  https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/digital-markets-taskforce#taskforce-advice.
139  As exceptions to this principle, narrow objective justifications are possible for app in-
stalling (Art. 6(1)(b)) and site loading (Art. 6(1)(c)).
140  Impact Assessment, para. 158.
141  DMA Proposal, Art. 3(7) and Impact Assessment, para. 399.
142  Also Monti (2021).
such measures with the business users and the compet-
itors of the gatekeepers; (iii)  finally, the Commission 
decides whether the measures are effective to achieve the 
objective of the obligation and proportionate given the 
characteristics of the gatekeeper. In practice, this should 
lead to a determination of compliant measures, done in 
a collaborative manner between the Commission and the 
regulated gatekeepers. 
47. Such specification process could also provide for an
explicit and well-framed defence to be brought by the
gatekeepers. Such defence could be helpful because many
practices in the digital economy have multiple positive
and negative effects on contestability and fairness
(and welfare and innovation) and there are (still) many
unknowns in the competitive dynamics of digital markets. 
At the substantive level, the gatekeeper relying on such
defence should demonstrate convincingly that a practice
does not harm market contestability or B2B unfairness.
This should not be, however, the DMA equivalent of an
efficiency defence under competition law. In particular, it
should not suffice to show that a course of conduct gener-
ates short-run efficiencies if, at the same time, it increases
market power and reduces longer-term competition and
innovation. Indeed, the contestability objective implies
that long-term competition is favoured over short-term
efficiencies. At the procedural level, the defence should
be brought during the specification process and within its 
timeframe, so it should not delay the regulatory process.
48. Moreover, during the specification process, the
Commission could also have the possibility of refraining
from imposing a specific obligation to a regulated gate-
keeper, on the basis of the principles of effectiveness and
proportionality.143 This is all the more important given
that, under the current proposal, the flexibility clause
provides that the Commission may add new obligations
to the black and grey lists but cannot remove obligations.
4. Institutional design
49. As the regulated gatekeepers are large, often global,
firms whose practices affect most—if not all—Member
States, it is appropriate to centralise enforcement at the
EU level.144 It is also pragmatic to confer enforcement
power to the Commission instead of setting up a new
EU regulatory agency, which would have raised legal and
political difficulties.145 However, those important new
powers of the Commission raise several issues.
143  This is a form of  “forbearance” clause, as in Electronic Communications Regulation
where the NRA should only apply the obligations which are proportionate: EECC, Art. 
68.
144  BEREC Opinion on the European Commission’s proposal for a Digital Markets Act: 
For a swift, effective and future-proof  regulatory intervention, BoR (21) 35, section 3.
145  In particular the old case law of  the Court of  Justice which considers that the EU leg-
islature could not delegate an executive function to a newly created regulatory agency 
without upsetting the institutional balance of  the EU Treaties: CJEC, 13 June 1958, 
Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche v. High Authority of  the European Coal and Steel 
Community, case 9-56, EU:C:1958:7. However such case law has been softened in CJEU, 
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4.1 The features of the Commission 
as the EU digital regulator
50.  If the Commission wants to become an EU-level 
specific regulator on the model of NRAs in other areas 
of sector-specific regulation, it should then partake in the 
prevailing EU model for NRAs, which relies on a combina-
tion of independence, accountability and expertise.146 For 
one, the Commission should then be independent not only 
from the regulated gatekeepers (as is the case now), but 
also from political power: such an independence require-
ment may be in tension with the (geo-)political role that 
the Commission is increasingly eager to play. Thus, the 
old debate on the independence of DG Competition and 
the need to create a separate EU antitrust agency may 
come back with a vengeance as the Commission acquires 
more regulatory powers and, at the same time, wants to 
become more political. With those increasing powers, the 
Commission should also be increasingly accountable, which 
may imply more hearings of the Commission department 
in charge of the DMA before the European Parliament and 
strict judicial review of its decisions by the EU courts.
51.  Finally, the Commission should also have suffi-
cient budgetary and human resources. The Commission 
foresees a team of 80 FTEs by 2025,147 but that may not 
be enough especially given the strict deadlines with which 
the Commission must comply. Also, the composition of 
the staff is as important as its size. Indeed, a key feature 
of the DMA is to give to the Commission extensive inves-
tigation powers over databases and algorithms. Those new 
powers will be very useful given the importance of data 
and algorithms in the impugned conduct. However, these 
investigation powers could only be exercised effectively if  
the Commission has the human and technical capability 
to analyse and interpret the large volumes and variety 
of data provided by the platforms.148 Regarding human 
capabilities, the Commission could set up in-house dedi-
cated teams of data analysis and AI specialists as national 
authorities are increasingly doing.149 Regarding tech-
nological capabilities and following its White Paper on 
AI,150 the Commission should develop its own AI tools 
to process the data to be analysed as is increasingly done 
by financial regulators151 and by competition agencies.152
146  See Larouche, Hanretty and Reindl (2012).
147  Commission Explanatory Memorandum to the DMA Proposal, p. 11.
148  For instance, in the Google Shopping antitrust investigation, the Commission had to analyse 
very significant quantities of  real-world data including 5.2 terabytes of  actual search results 
from Google (around 1.7 billion search queries): Commission press release IP/17/1784 of  
27 June 2017, Antitrust: Commission fines Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as 
search engine by giving illegal advantage to own comparison shopping service.
149  For instance, the French authorities have set up the “Pôle d’expertise de la régulation 
numérique,” which offers digital expertise to the French regulatory administrations, and 
the French Competition Authority has established a digital unit. In the UK, the CMA 
has set up CMA’s a Data, Technology and Analytics (DaTA) unit and Ofcom has created 
an Emerging Technology directorate and data science team.
150  White Paper of  19 February 2020 on Artificial Intelligence – A European approach to 
excellence and trust, COM(2020) 65 final, p. 8.
151  For instance, the Data Science/Artificial Intelligence (Datalab) excellence hub created 
in 2018 within the French financial regulator. See also the Conference organised by the 
Club of  Regulators in cooperation with the OECD Network of  Economic Regulators, 
RegTechs: Feedback from the First Experiments, available at http://chairgovreg.fonda-
tion-dauphine.fr/node/708.
152  See Schrepel (2021).
4.2 The combined use of multiple 
powers by the Commission
52.  The Commission should maximise the synergies 
between its different powers (which are based on diffe-
rent legal instruments) especially when they apply to the 
same digital platforms while being clear and predictable 
about how those powers will be applied and combined.153 
4.2.1 Concurrent regulatory and competition powers
53.  Once the DMA is adopted, the Commission will 
have concurrent regulatory and competition powers. 
To intervene against conduct of the digital gatekeepers 
which would (already) be regulated by the DMA, the 
Commission should rely on its DMA powers as the obli-
gations and prohibitions are compulsory. The interesting 
question, however, is which route the Commission will 
follow when intervening against courses of conduct that 
are not (yet) covered by the DMA. Given the concur-
rency of powers, the Commission would be able to 
choose between competition law and the DMA. Under 
the former, the Commission would open an abuse of 
dominance case and should build a theory of harm to 
the requisite legal standard imposed by the EU courts. 
Under the latter, the Commission would launch a market 
investigation and then adopt a delegated act to add the 
course of conduct under consideration to the list of the 
DMA obligations. In order to do so, the Commission 
should prove that such conduct weakens market contes-
tability or creates an imbalance between the rights and 
the obligations of the gatekeeper and its business users. 
This standard of intervention will have to be interpreted 
by the courts but, on first analysis, it may be lower for a 
delegated act under the DMA than the for an competi-
tion case under Article 102 TFEU. 
54.  It is reasonable to expect that the Commission will 
choose between its competition and DMA powers not 
only according to the type of gatekeeper conduct at 
play but also as a function of the ease of intervention. 
As the DMA intervention standard may be lower than 
the competition standard, we may reasonably expect the 
Commission to favour market investigation under the 
DMA over competition law enforcement when inter-
vening against designated gatekeepers. This is not a 
problem as such, since the regulated platforms have 
gatekeeper power. However, to ensure legal predictability, 
the Commission should explain in advance the criteria it 
will use to choose between its regulatory and competi-
tion powers.154 
153  Also Marsden and Podszun (2020).
154  In the UK, where most of  the regulators have concurrent power, they have concluded 
MoU with the competition authority which to clarify how concurrent powers will be ex-
ercised. See, for instance, Memorandum of  understanding of  8 February 2016 between 
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55. To do that, the Commission may, for instance, rely
on the criteria it uses to select markets for ex ante regu-
lation in telecommunications.155 Such selection is based
on three criteria, and the third one in particular indicates
that: “Competition law interventions are likely to be insuf-
ficient where for instance the compliance requirements of
an intervention to redress persistent market failure(s) are
extensive or where frequent and/or timely intervention is
indispensable.”156 The Commission could also rely on the
criteria proposed by Motta and Peitz (2020) to determine 
when the new EU market investigation tool (the so-called 
New Competition Tool as it was then mooted) would be
a better route than an Article  102 TFEU enforcement
action. According to the authors, this may be the case
when a competition law assessment is long, complex and
uncertain or when a competition law assessment would
not solve a generalised problem, but just deal with one
specific conduct or firm.
56. On that basis, possible criteria to favour a DMA
investigation over competition law enforcement could
comprise the recurrence or the prevalence of a conduct
by different types of gatekeepers, or the need to inter-
vene quickly or with remedies that require an extensive
monitoring.157 Adopting such criteria would be useful
to ensure legal predictability, without, however, under-
cutting the responsibility of the Commission to apply
EU competition law. Indeed, competition law—which
is primary law—cannot legally be sacrificed on the altar
of the DMA—which is secondary law. More fundamen-
tally, given that the initial list of obligations and prohibi-
tions found in the DMA appears largely based on experi-
ence in competition law enforcement, it may seem appro-
priate to continue to use competition law as the first line
of intervention, in order to build up experience and “test-
drive” theories of harm in actual cases before courses of
conduct are enshrined in the DMA list of prohibitions
and obligations.
4.2.2 DMA and DSA powers
57. Next to the DMA, the DSA proposal also aims to
confer important new investigation and sanctioning
power to the Commission against very large online plat-
forms. Those platforms are defined as platforms that store 
information provided by, and at the request of, a recipient 
of a service; disseminate such information to the public;
and have more than 45 million active users.158 Therefore,
some designated gatekeepers under the DMA will also
155  In the EU telecommunications regulatory framework, the “three criteria test” placing 
the frontiers between competition law and regulation is used to select markets for regu-
lation but not the obligations which are imposed on those markets. In the DMA, the cri-
teria should be used to select the obligations to be imposed but not the markets (or core 
platform services) on which those obligations will be imposed.
156  EECC, Art. 67(1) clarified by Commission Recommendation (EU) 2020/2245 of  18
December 2020 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communi-
cations sector susceptible to ex ante regulation, OJ L 439, 29.12.2020, p. 23, recital 17. 
See also Never and Preissl (2008).
157  Those criteria may also be inspired by the reasons mentioned by the Commission ser-
vices for the insufficiency of  competition law in dealing with some structural competi-
tion problems in the digital economy: Impact Assessment Report on the DMA Proposal 
(fn. 138), at paras. 119–124.
158  DSA Proposal, Arts. 2(h) and 25.
meet the criteria of very large online platforms under 
the DSA. Those very large online platforms are subject 
to a series of transparency and risk assessment obliga-
tions which may have to be enforced by the Commission 
in cooperation with the regulatory authorities of the 
Member State where the platform is established.
58. Although the DMA and DSA obligations pursue
different objectives, they may apply to the same digital
platforms and may complement each other. Therefore,
it may be helpful to clarify how the obligations imposed
under the DSA (in particular the new transparency requi-
rements on online advertising and on recommendation
systems)159 will complement and support the objectives
and obligations imposed under the DMA.160 Both types
of obligations will also be enforced by the Commission,
and enforcement synergies are surely possible. In partic-
ular, it could be useful to clarify how the information
received during a DSA investigation could be used for a
DMA investigation and vice-versa.
4.3 National authorities supporting 
centralised enforcement 
by the Commission
59. While it is justified that the Commission enforces
the DMA given the small number of targeted gatekee-
pers as well as their size and the widespread impact of
their practices, more involvement of the national autho-
rities than currently foreseen may be needed to support
centralised enforcement by the Commission. National
authorities may be particularly helpful for the following
tasks, for which they may have a comparative advantage
compared to the Commission. First, they are more loca-
lised than the Commission, hence may more easily receive 
complaints from small and local business users. National
authorities may receive such complaints and, when
founded, forward them to the Commission for further
action. Second, national authorities may have expertise
and experience that can usefully support the Commission 
in specifying the obligations of the grey list. Indeed,
several national authorities have expertise in dealing with
digital platforms as well as data and algorithms; they also 
have experience in implementing some of the obligations
of the DMA proposal such as interoperability, access to
data or data portability. Third, national authorities may
be closer to the “field” and may more easily monitor the
correct implementation of the imposed obligations.161
60. It is also key that the national authorities assisting
and supporting the Commission are independent from
political power. While the Commission may expect
159  DSA Proposal, Arts. 29 and 30.
160  Although the Impact Assessment (at paras. 410–413) calls for separation of  the two 
enforcement mechanisms because of  different objectives, competences and level of  
centralisation.
161  As it has sometimes been practised under the merger control: Commission Decision of
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such independence,162 it is by no means guaranteed. 
Under the DMA proposal, the DMAC is a comitology 
committee whose members should be representatives 
from the Member States, but not necessarily from their 
independent authorities (NCA or NRA).163 In practice, 
national representatives in comitology committees are 
often coming from ministries. To deal with this issue, EU 
competition law and most EU sectoral economic regula-
tion provide for an additional instance next to the comi-
tology-type committee, namely, a network or agency 
regrouping NCAs or NRAs, as the case may be.164 In the 
same vein, the DMA could establish, next to the DMAC, 
a network of independent national authorities.165 It would 
then be up to the Member State to decide which (existing 
or new) national authorities should be designated as their 
National Digital Markets Authority in such network.
5. Oversight and enforcement 
modes
61.  The oversight of digital gatekeepers and the enfor-
cement of the DMA will prove extremely difficult 
because the digital sector is complex and fast moving, 
the Commission suffers from a significant information 
asymmetry vis-à-vis the gatekeepers and the proposed 
deadlines are relatively short. Therefore, DMA enfor-
cement could be made more collaborative (while care-
fully guarding against capture). It could be based on 
an “ecosystem of enforcement” where the regulator 
orchestrates DMA supervision and implementation 
by the platforms and their (business and end) users.166 
To achieve this, the DMA could learn much from its 
companion DSA proposal.
62. The DMA proposal already provides for some rules 
that will nudge the regulated gatekeepers to coope-
rate with the Commission. The gatekeeper presumption 
based on financial and user size will incentivise the plat-
forms to disclose relevant information (for instance, on 
their user lock-in or single-homing, or entry barriers) if  
they wish to rebut the presumption. Similarly, the speci-
fication of grey list obligations encourages a regulatory 
dialogue. Also, the graduated sanctions in case of viola-
tion of the obligations foster compliance. 
162  Impact Assessment (at paras. 192 and 409) refers to independent national authorities as 
members of  the Digital Markets Advisory Committee.
163  Regulation (EU) No. 182/2011 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  16 
February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for 
control by Member States of  the Commission’s exercise of  implementing powers, OJ 
L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13, Art. 2. 
164  EECC, Art. 118 establishing the Communications Committee (COCOM), which is a 
comitology committee, and Regulation (EU) 2018/1971 of  the European Parliament 
and of  the Council of  11 December 2018 establishing the Body of  the European 
Regulators for Electronic Communications, OJ [2018] OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, p.1.
165  This is also proposed in the BEREC Opinion on the European Commission’s proposal for 
a Digital Markets Act, section 3.
166  See de Streel and Ledger (2021). See also French regulators, New regulatory mecha-
nisms – data-driven regulation, July 2019; World Economic Forum (2020).
63. However, given the difficulty of oversight and enfor-
cement, those rules may not be enough. They may 
need to be complemented with other tools. As already 
mentioned, the specification process of grey list obliga-
tion should more explicitly and clearly involve the regu-
lated gatekeepers, in particular by requiring a notification 
of the measures they plan to take to implement the obli-
gation. The DMA could also explicitly provide that the 
Commission can request that a gatekeeper test different 
compliance designs (A/B testing) with its users and report 
on their effects so the Commission could decide which 
measure or remedy is most effective. Moreover, the DMA 
could impose more internal compliance mechanisms, as 
it has been proposed in the DSA. Those mechanisms may 
include the requirement to perform a regular risk assess-
ment of corporate practices,167 to carry out a regular 
independent audit168 or to appoint compliance officers.169 
64. Finally, the DMA could rely more on co-regulation 
and codes of conduct to ensure compliance with its obli-
gations.170 As codes of conduct would be developed and 
complied with by platforms, there is a risk that such form 
of self-regulation becomes self-serving and/or is not well 
enforced. Therefore, those codes should comply with the 
principles for better self- and co-regulation set out by the 
European Commission.171 Those principles ensure, on the 
one hand, that rules are prepared openly and by as many 
as possible relevant actors representing different interests 
and values and, on the other hand, that they are moni-
tored in a way that is sufficiently open and autonomous, 
and are sanctioned when violated.
65.  Next to the regulated gatekeepers, the Commission 
could also be supported by the other stakeholders, in 
particular by the relevant business users. Currently, the 
DMA proposal is silent on the very useful role that those 
stakeholders could play. The DMA could clarify how and 
when business users may lodge confidential complaints 
without fearing retaliation by the gatekeeper from which 
they depend.172 It could also give a role to business users 
and end-users, as well as to providers of substitute and 
complementary services, in the specifications of the 
grey list obligations, in the market testing of commit-
ments proposed by the gatekeepers and in the design of 
remedies in case of non-compliance.
167  DSA Proposal, Art. 26. Also GDPR, Art. 35.
168  DSA Proposal, Art. 28.
169  DSA Proposal, Art. 32. Also GDPR, Arts. 37–39.
170  DSA Proposal, Art. 35. Also GDPR, Arts. 40–41.
171  Those principles are available at  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/
best-practice-principles-better-self-and-co-regulation. See also Finck (2018).
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IV. Conclusion
66. In proposing the Digital Markets Act, the Commission 
aims to tame the gatekeeper power of the largest digital
platforms in Europe and ensure more contestability and
fairness in the digital economy. Ultimately, the goal of
the EU institutions is to take back control over the digital 
economy and guarantee the autonomy and self-determi-
nation of EU business users that depend on the biggest
digital platforms. While the Commission proposal should 
be commended as a courageous step in the right direc-
tion, it could be improved during the ongoing legislative
negotiations. Two main improvements are particularly
needed to ensure the effectiveness of the DMA. First, the 
detailed prohibitions and obligations should be comple-
mented with more principle-based provisions, in order 
to bolster the resilience of the law in an economic sector 
which is dynamic and sometimes unpredictable. Second, 
while enforcement should remain centralised with the 
European Commission, national authorities should play a 
bigger role in supporting the Commission in its very diffi-
cult oversight and enforcement tasks. Moreover, enforce-
ment modes could be more modelled on existing sectoral 
regulation rather than on competition law. In that regard, 
the DMA has a lot to learn from its companion proposal 
for a Digital Services Act. n
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